

How EU policy can win the next general election

Impact of EU policy on voting intention
and constituency outcomes

September 2026

By **Tom Brufatto**

And **Oliver Nicholls, James Coldwell** and **Ayesha Chaudhry**

**Evidence.
Action.
Hope.**

Best for Britain

The problems Britain faces are real, the solutions being offered are false. **Our job is to provide the evidence-led answers that fix Britain.**

Economic growth has stalled.

We are working to reintegrate our economy with the EU to get GDP growing again.

Neither business nor government can invest what's needed to fix Britain.

We will advocate for the policies needed to make the most of the economic gains achieved by removing UK-EU trade barriers or rejoining the EU.

Voters, impatient for improvements in quality of life, are turning to extreme politicians.

We uncover the frustrations and emotions driving voters to the far-right, and provide evidence-led answers for progressive parties to keep extremists out of No.10.

Authors



Tom Brufatto

Executive Director of Policy and Research



Oliver Nicholls

Policy Senior Manager



Ayesha Chaudhry

Policy and External Affairs Senior Officer



James Coldwell

Senior Manager, External Affairs

Executive Summary

This report assesses the impact of four hypothetical Labour policy positions on EU relations on Westminster voting intention, to estimate how Labour's EU policy position might affect the outcome of a General Election.

The four Labour policy positions on EU relations tested were: seeking a closer relationship with the EU without rejoining the Customs Union, Single Market or the EU itself; rejoining the Customs Union; rejoining the EU Single Market; rejoining the EU. The report also includes the results of a standard Westminster voting intention question.

To carry out the assessment, Best for Britain asked YouGov to survey 13,433 people between 27th May – 11th June 2026, before Andy Burnham became leader of the Labour Party and UK Prime Minister. For each of the four Labour policy positions tested, and standard Westminster voting intention question, YouGov carried out a corresponding multilevel regression and post-stratification (MRP) analysis to estimate the vote shares of each Westminster party in the 632 parliamentary constituencies in Great Britain.

The report builds on previous Best for Britain research assessing the impact of Labour's EU policy position on EU relations on propensity to vote¹, and which EU relationship people wanted to see the UK Government propose².

The results in this report showed that the more ambitious Labour's policy pitch on EU relations, the better the party's electoral performance at the next General Election is likely to be.

All EU relationship options beyond the UK Government's current red lines were found to increase Labour's voting intention above Reform UK's, rising to 37% of national vote share where Labour supported membership of the EU. Crucially, Labour moving to a more ambitious policy position did not result in an increase in support for Reform UK, or the Conservative Party.

Best for Britain then used the YouGov projections and conducted further modelling and analysis. Our analysis of how Labour's policy pitch on EU relations would affect seats won by Labour at the 2024 General Election showed that the more ambitious Labour was, the more constituencies it was likely to hold on to. EU membership was the only EU policy position which put Labour close to keeping a parliamentary majority, with the party

¹ Best for Britain, [How EU policy affects Labour's Electability](#), September 2026

² Best for Britain, [Beyond the red lines](#), September 2026

estimated to hold on to 321 of the seats it won at the last election in this scenario - just three short of a majority.

Our analysis shows that the more ambitious Labour's policy position on EU relations, the fewer seats it was estimated to lose to parties on both its left and right flanks across the whole of Great Britain. In seats where Labour is facing Reform UK, by appealing to left-of-centre voters, an ambitious EU policy allowed Labour to outpace Reform UK, winning more contests. In seats where Labour is facing parties on its left flank, again by appealing to left-of-centre voters, it was able to push challengers into second place. The effect was observed in all regions of England, but was most noticeable in Scotland and Wales, where Labour is facing a real possibility of being squeezed out of Westminster politics altogether.

In Scotland, moving to a policy position of EU membership resulted in Labour retaining 32 seats, or 86% of the constituencies it won in 2024. In Wales, an election pledge to EU membership resulted in Labour retaining up to 25 of the 27 constituencies won at the last election.

Labour moving to support a policy of either joining a Customs Union or the EU Single Market was found to substantially increase the party's national vote share too, to 34% and 33% respectively. However, previous Best for Britain research found the Customs Union and Single Market policy proposals to be the least popular of any option for closer relations with the EU, even behind the UK Government's current approach to EU relations within its 2024 manifesto red lines. As such, it was most likely that the positive performance of the policies was due to respondents being 'squeezed'. That is to say that the draw of even these more modest Labour policy pitches on EU relations were enough to significantly shift voting patterns in Labour's favour, despite people preferring EU membership.

However, neither a policy pledge to joining the Customs Union, or the EU Single Market, put Labour close to the seat haul necessary to form a majority government after the next General Election. Indeed, the results showed that a Labour-led coalition government would be the only likely electoral outcome of Labour pledging to join the Customs Union or Single Market. Furthermore, this was before consideration of how all other parties might react to Labour backing a Customs Union or the EU Single Market at an election, which was not captured by the data presented in this report. This would likely be a significant factor in Scotland and Wales, where the SNP and Plaid Cymru could simply outflank Labour by pitching a policy of full EU membership.

The impossibility of modelling how all other parties would react to Labour offering different policies on EU relations at the next election, the various combinations of reaction possible, and the practicalities of General Elections such as tactical voting, meant that the seat totals for the Liberal Democrats and the Green Party were ultimately unlikely to be reflected at an actual election event. Consequently, Best for Britain's additional analysis sought to address

this by using the YouGov projections and conducted further modelling and analysis to develop a scenario-based approach to estimate overall seat hauls for each of the scenarios modelled. The results, however, were the same. Labour maintaining its red lines on EU relations was estimated to result in Labour failing to hold on to enough seats to form a government - whether alone, or in coalition. Both the scenarios where Labour pledged to join a Customs Union or the EU Single Market were most likely to result in a Labour-led coalition government. The only scenario to place Labour close to obtaining a majority, was where it pledged to take the UK into the EU. In this scenario, Labour was estimated to win 321 seats - five short of a majority.

Whichever way the data was analysed, more ambitious policy pitches by Labour worsened the electoral prospects of both the Conservative Party, and Reform UK. The more ambitious Labour's pitch on EU relations, the more the Conservative Party was likely to be squeezed out of seat contests by both Reform UK on its right flank, and by the parties on its left flank. The more ambitious Labour's policy position on EU relations, the fewer seats Reform UK was likely to win - because Labour successfully appealed to more left-of-centre voters in more constituencies, winning more contests against Reform UK in seats across Great Britain.

As political parties start to shift their focus to the next UK General Election, the data in this report suggests that a commitment to EU membership in Labour's next manifesto will be key to returning a Labour-led government, rather than a Reform UK-led one.

Headline Findings

1. All EU relationship options beyond the UK Government's current red lines increased Labour's voting intention above Reform UK's, rising to 37% of national vote share where Labour supported membership of the EU. Labour moving to a more ambitious policy position did not result in an increase in support for Reform UK, or the Conservatives.
2. Where Labour pledged to support EU membership, the party was estimated to retain 323 seats of the 411 it won at the 2024 General Election, just three short of a majority. The more ambitious Labour's policy position on EU relations, the more seats the party won in 2024 it was likely to hold on to, and the more likely Labour was to stay in power after the next election.
3. Labour moving to support a Customs Union, or membership of the EU Single Market, also resulted in substantial increases in Labour's national vote share, estimated at 34% and 33% respectively. When it came to seat hauls however, neither supporting a Customs Union (288), or the Single Market (280), put Labour in range of retaining enough seats won in 2024 to form a majority government. Continuing to support its current red lines only resulted in Labour holding on to 190 seats won at the last election.
4. Labour moving to support EU membership was found to prevent Labour losing seats to parties on both its left and right flanks, and increase Labour's seat haul in all regions of England, but especially in Scotland and Wales.
5. Even scenario-based analysis of seat marginality, as well as tactical voting showed that moving to a policy position of EU membership was the most likely EU policy to put Labour within touching distance of an overall parliamentary majority on Central seat estimates.

Table of Contents

Executive Summary	2
Headline Findings	5
Table of Contents	6
1. Methodology	7
1.1. The survey	7
1.2. The YouGov MRP	9
1.3. The limitations of hypothetical questions	9
1.4. Political limitations	10
2. Nomenclature	11
3. What Parliament would look like if an Election were held in June 2026	13
4. How Labour's EU policy affects Labour voting intention	16
5. How Labour's EU policy affects Labour-held Seats	18
5.1. Topline results for all of Great Britain	18
5.2. Scotland	30
5.3. Wales	33
5.4. The North West	36
5.5. East Midlands	39
5.6. The South West	43
5.7. Yorkshire and the Humber	46
6. Seats where Labour could advance	50
7. Liberal Democrat Seats	52
7.1. June 2026 Westminster Voting intention	52
7.2. How Labour's EU policy changes affect Liberal Democrat seats	54
8. Green Party Seats	55
8.1. June 2026 Westminster voting intention	55
8.2. How Labour's EU policy changes affected Green seats	57
9. How Labour's EU policy would affect an Election	58
9.1. How 'Low' estimates are calculated	58
9.2. How 'Central' estimates were calculated	59
9.3. How 'High' estimates were calculated	60
9.4. Results in all scenarios	61
9.5. 'Closer relationship' (current government position)	62
9.6. Single Market and Customs Union	63
9.7. EU Membership	66
10. Conclusions	68

1. Methodology

On behalf of Best for Britain, YouGov surveyed 13,433 people between 27th May – 11th June 2026.

The survey was conducted using an online interview of members of the YouGov Plc GB panel of 400,000+ individuals who have agreed to take part in surveys. An email was sent to panellists selected at random from the base sample according to the sample definition, inviting them to take part in the survey and providing a link to the survey.

The samples were weighted to the profile of the sample definition to provide a representative reporting sample. The profile is normally derived from census data or, if not available from the census, from industry accepted data.

For the question presented to respondents, YouGov carried out a MRP (multilevel regression and post-stratification) analysis. Results were projected across all constituencies in Great Britain, with each multilevel model run with 3000 iterations across seven monte-carlo Markov chains.

The full MRP model process took information gleaned from estimating a multilevel model between question response and respondent and area background and characteristics, and projected these findings down to all 632 British 2024 Westminster Parliamentary constituencies.

The MRP model was built and designed specifically for this project and question topic.

1.1. The survey

The survey included a total of five questions. Firstly, respondents were asked to indicate their Westminster voting intention.

Question 1:

"Thinking specifically about your own constituency, if there were a general election held tomorrow and these are the parties standing, which party would you vote for?"

In answering question 1, respondents could choose from a list of ten answers, as listed in Table 1.

Table 1: Parties Prompted

Possible answers
Conservative
Labour
Liberal Democrats
Scottish National Party (SNP)
Plaid Cymru
Reform UK
Green
Some other party
Would not vote
Don't know

Respondents were then asked how they would vote in a Westminster election under four hypothetical scenarios, each presenting a different Labour policy position on EU relations.

Hypothetical questions:

"Now please imagine that there is a general election happening tomorrow. All parties are standing in your constituency, looking to secure your vote. Which party would you vote for if Labour pledged to..."

The full set of hypothetical Labour policy positions are listed in Table 2.

Table 2: Hypothetical Labour Party policy positions tested

Question number	Hypothetical Labour Party EU policy
2	...have the UK rejoin the European Union (EU)
3	...have the UK rejoin the EU Single Market
4	...have the UK rejoin the EU Customs Union
5	...have a closer relationship with the EU, but without joining the Customs Union, Single Market, or the European Union (EU) itself

For each policy position listed in Table 2, respondents could choose from the list of ten possible answers in Table 1.

The full survey script can be found in Appendix I.

1.2. The YouGov MRP

For each of the five questions presented to respondents, YouGov carried out a MRP (multilevel regression and post-stratification) analysis. Results were projected across all constituencies in Great Britain, with each multilevel model run with 3000 iterations across seven Markov chains.

The full MRP model process took information gleaned from estimating a multilevel model between question response and respondent and area background and characteristics, and projected these findings down to all 632 British 2024 Westminster Parliamentary constituencies.

Each MRP projection produced a range of credible outcomes for each party both nationally and within each constituency. These intervals represented the breadth of possible outcomes that would be probable given the data.

YouGov built and designed the MRP model specifically for this project and question topic.

As outlined in the Executive Summary, the findings presented throughout this report are YouGov constituency-level MRP projections plus additional Best for Britain modelling and analysis.

1.3. The limitations of hypothetical questions

The YouGov MRP model developed for this project did not therefore predict the seat outcomes as a Westminster Voting Intention MRP would. Instead, it predicted the change in voting intention based on the specific EU policy area polled.

Polling voting intention in hypothetical, future scenarios such as those explored in questions 2-5 in this research can come with a high potential degree of error. Respondents are not always able to accurately predict their future behaviour, and when asked to consider a specific situation where only one variable has changed but all others have remained constant, there is a risk that the 'changed variable' then has an overstated influence on their self-reported prospective behaviour. Furthermore, respondents are able to 'project' onto the hypothetical situation their own preferences and beliefs when they answer questions pertaining to it. This means that respondents could be thinking about very different potential arrangements, trade-offs, and consequences when answering the question. This limitation cannot be mitigated, as it is an intrinsic consequence of seeking to understand voter behaviours in scenarios which have not yet happened.

Seeking to isolate the impact of a single policy on Westminster voting intention, as is the case with questions 2-5 in Table 2, also results in scenarios akin to the General Election being fought on a single policy issue. In practice, any one policy area at election time is always in competition for space and attention with hundreds of others. Once again, this limitation cannot be mitigated, as it is a direct consequence of the experiment seeking to isolate the impact of the single policy area in question.

1.4. Political limitations

By design, questions 2-5 in Table 2 aimed to isolate the change in Westminster voting intention resulting from a change in Labour party policy on UK-EU relations. The survey did not present respondents with the UK-EU relations policy of any other Westminster party, or more importantly, consider how all other parties would react to Labour's new hypothetical change in policy position on UK-EU relations.

In practice, Labour changing its policy position on EU relations would cause a significant repositioning, and/or re-stating, of the EU relations policy of all other Westminster political parties. In turn, all parties changing or restating their policy on EU relations would elevate the salience of UK-EU relations as an electoral issue, which in turn would affect people's voting intention. The public debate in a General Election campaign which included any of the EU policy propositions listed in Table 2 would also prompt new political dividing lines and political commentary on the benefits and draw-backs of closer UK-EU relations. These effects could not be captured as part of the survey. The results are best described as the political appeal of each EU policy position tested.

The MRP models - developed specifically to estimate the constituency-level vote share of all Westminster parties - did not include modelling or consideration of tactical voting behaviours prevalent at UK General Elections.

As a result, the MRP models accurately estimated the plausible shift in party vote shares in each GB constituency due to the change in Labour party policy only. To turn these plausible estimates into realistic election outcomes, we considered the likely impact of tactical voting through a series of assumptions.

2. Nomenclature

Throughout this report, the term ‘Voters’ is used to refer to how respondents voted at the 2024 General Election. For example, respondents who voted for the Conservative Party at the 2024 General Election are referred to as ‘Conservative Voters’.

The term ‘Supporters’ refers to respondents’ voting intention at the time the survey was conducted. For example, respondents who said they would vote for the Labour Party if an election were held tomorrow are referred to as ‘Labour Supporters’.

The term ‘Defectors’ refers to respondents who voted Labour at the 2024 General Election but who would now vote for other parties. For example, ‘Labour to Green Defectors’ refers to respondents who voted Labour in 2024 but said they would vote for the Green Party if an election were held tomorrow.

‘Labour-Left Defectors’ refers to respondents who voted for Labour at the 2024 General Election but who said they would vote for one of the Green Party, Liberal Democrats, the SNP or Plaid Cymru if an election were held tomorrow. ‘Labour-Right Defectors’ refers to respondents who would vote for the Conservatives or Reform UK if an election were held tomorrow.

Respondents who voted for Labour at the 2024 General Election but who said they would not vote if an election were held tomorrow are referred to as ‘Labour Non-Voters’.

YouGov surveyed 13,433 people. The data was weighted to match the sample with the overall country’s demographics. Weighted/unweighted sample sizes are in Tables 3 and 4.

Table 3: Number of respondents in each subgroup, by Vote in 2024 General Election and current Westminster Voting Intention

	Con	Lab	Lib Dem	Reform UK	Green
	Vote in 2024 General Election				
Weighted	2148	3066	1097	1289	704
Unweighted	1974	3286	1184	1362	721
	Westminster Voting Intention				
Weighted	1584	1487	1197	2225	1544
Unweighted	1542	1650	1297	2249	1489

Table 4: Number and proportion of respondents in each Labour Defector subgroup

	All Labour Defectors	Labour 2024 to Green now	Labour 2024 to Reform UK now
Weighted (including as % of overall defectors)	1930	551 (29%)	195 (10%)
Unweighted (including as % of overall defectors)	1974	555 (28%)	189 (10%)

3. What Parliament would look like if an Election were held in June 2026

The MRP models produced a low, central and high estimate of vote shares and seat hauls for each political party. Table 5 below showed the central estimate for each party's vote share and seat haul, had an election taken place in June 2026.

Table 5: Central estimates for each party's vote share, seat haul and second places, had an election taken place in June 2026

	Vote share (%)	Seat Haul	Second places
Reform	26	266	163
Con	19	92	166
Lab	18	90	151
Green	15	22	60
LibDem	13	77	11
SNP	3	41	10
Plaid	1	15	11
Other	4	12	6
Tie	-	17	54

These results showed that, had an election taken place in June 2026, it would have likely resulted in a hung parliament, with Reform UK the largest party both by vote share (25.8%) and seats (266). The MRP suggested Reform UK would have won more seats than the Conservatives (92), Labour (90), and the Liberal Democrats (77) combined.




Figure 1: Constituency-level projection under June 2026 Westminster voting intention, central estimates

The MRP estimated that had an election taken place in June 2026, Labour would have lost 218 of the seats it won in 2024 to Reform UK, 22 to the Conservatives, 20 to the Green Party, 32 to the SNP, 11 to Plaid Cymru, and one to the Liberal Democrats (Sheffield Hallam).

However, the large proportion of seats estimated to change hands from Labour to Reform UK did not indicate Labour losing a similar proportion of votes to Reform UK.

The MRP models did not estimate the number of voters who had switched their support between parties since the 2024 election. The MRP analysis simply estimated seat-level vote shares, and therefore winners of the electoral contest, based on national vote shares and without consideration of respondents' previous voting patterns.

Indeed, YouGov analysis after the May 2026 local elections found that, of the 2024 Labour voters who turned out, only 46% vote Labour³. Of the rest, one in five had (22%) switched to the Greens, one in six (16%) to the Liberal Democrats. Only 6% had switched to Reform UK and 5% to the Conservatives. Therefore, roughly four former Labour voters moved to the left for every one who moved to the right.

Previous Best for Britain analysis⁴ from April/May 2026 found that over half (54%) of Labour's Defectors since the 2024 General Election intended to vote for either the Liberal Democrats, Green Party, SNP or Plaid Cymru. A further 30% were unsure who to vote for, or would not vote at all, and only 16% were minded to vote either for the Conservatives or Reform UK.

It is therefore likely that the MRP results reflected the outcome of Labour mainly losing support to other left-of-centre parties, allowing Reform UK to win the seat-level contests because of its comparatively more consolidated supporter base.

³ YouGov, [Labour's voter coalition broke more to left than right at 2026 local elections](#), May 2026

⁴ Best for Britain, [How EU policy affects Labour's Electability](#), September 2026

4. How Labour's EU policy affects Labour voting intention

The results in Figure 2 showed the changes in Westminster voting intention for each political party, for each of the hypothetical Labour policy positions on EU relations tested.




Figure 2: Central estimates of Westminster voting intention for all political parties, for each hypothetical Labour EU policy position tested In a scenario where Labour pledged full EU membership, Labour's voting intention doubled compared to June 2026 (from 18% to 37%).

The results also showed significant jumps in Labour's vote share in a scenario where it pledged to join the Customs Union (34%) and Single Market (33%). However, respondents were shown each scenario in sequence, rather than being asked to choose their preferred option from a list of policies. Respondents were asked to indicate which

party they would vote for in each scenario. Therefore, for each hypothetical Labour policy position on EU relations tested, respondents were 'squeezed'.

The results showed that an ambitious policy position on EU relations can substantially improve Labour voting intention.

All EU relationship options beyond the UK Government's current red lines increased Labour's voting intention above Reform UK's.

Labour moving to a policy of full EU membership resulted in the most significant increase in voting intention, rising to 11 percentage points clear of Reform UK.

Furthermore, the MRP questions did not mention any of the other parties' policy positions on EU relations, nor did the experiment include consideration of how political parties would adjust their own policies on EU relations. For example, if Labour adopted a Customs Union policy, the Liberal Democrats, Green Party, SNP or Plaid Cymru could respond by adopting a policy of full EU membership. Any party matching or surpassing the Labour policy position on EU relations is likely to reduce the 'squeeze' of votes from the Liberal Democrats, Greens, SNP and Plaid Cymru to Labour in each scenario tested, but especially in the Customs Union and Single Market scenarios.

Across all five scenarios, Reform UK's Westminster voting intention was unchanged (26%), indicating that Labour adopting more ambitious policy positions on EU relations would not result in an increase in Reform UK's vote share.

This result was in line with previous Best for Britain research, which found limited overlap between Labour and Reform UK's supporter bases⁵. The Conservatives' vote share declined from 20% to 16% compared to June 2026, in a scenario where Labour adopted a position of EU membership.

However, Labour's EU policy had a significant impact on Liberal Democrat and Green voting intentions overall. In both cases, a Labour pledge to pursue EU membership roughly halved the parties' vote share (from 14% to 7% for the Liberal Democrats, and 15% to 8% for the Green Party). This suggested that a more ambitious Labour policy on EU relations would consolidate support from other left-of-centre parties which, as previous Best for Britain has shown, draw on the support of former 'remain' voters at the 2016 referendum.

⁵ Best for Britain, [How EU policy affects Labour's Electability](#), September 2026

5. How Labour's EU policy affects Labour-held Seats

At the next general election, it was assumed that Labour would centre its focus on defending the seats it won at the 2024 election.

Therefore, MRP results were analysed by comparing what effect each of the polled EU policy positions had on seats won by Labour at the 2024 General Election.

5.1. Topline results for all of Great Britain

For each of the 411 seats won by Labour at the 2024 general election, and for each MRP, we measured:

- How many seats Labour was estimated to hold on to ('Labour Hold'), defined as seats where Labour's vote share was estimated to be five percentage points clear of the second-placed party.
- How many seats Labour was estimated to hold on to, marginally ('Labour Hold, marginal'), where on vote share Labour was estimated to take the seat, but less than five percentage points clear of the second-placed party.
- How many seats won by Labour in 2024 were estimated to be 'in reach'. These were defined as seats where Labour was estimated to come second, but less than five percentage points behind the first placed party.

Table 6 and Figure 3 show the number of seats falling into the above three categories, for each Labour EU policy tested.

Table 6: Number of Labour 2024 seats held (GB), according to Labour EU policy position

	Current WVI	Closer relations	Customs Union	Single Market	EU membership
Labour Hold	40	130	216	215	251
Labour Hold, marginal	50	60	72	65	72
Total Labour Held	90	190	288	280	323
Labour Second, in reach	35	71	62	62	43




Figure 3: Number of Labour 2024 seats held (GB), according to Labour EU policy position

The MRPs showed that the more ambitious Labour's EU policy was, the more seats it was likely to hold onto, and the more likely Labour was to stay in power after the next election.

The 43 additional seats in reach meant Labour going into an election campaign with a pledge for EU membership was estimated to give the party an estimated 'ceiling' of 366 seats, clear of the 326 necessary to form a second-term majority government.

The proximity of Labour's estimated seat haul to the 326 seats necessary to form a government meant the results showed a Labour-Led coalition government would be a possible outcome.

Table 7 and Figure 4 showed how many Labour seats won at the 2024 General Election were lost to other parties, for each of the Labour EU policy positions tested.

EU membership was the only EU policy position which put Labour close to obtaining a parliamentary majority.

In this scenario Labour was estimated to reach 323 seats, just three short of a majority.

The 323 seats included 251 that Labour won in 2024 and was estimated to hold by a margin of more than five percentage points, and a further 72 estimated to be held within the five percentage point margin.

Table 7: Number of Labour 2024 seats lost to other parties (GB), for each Labour EU policy position MRP

	Current WVI	Closer relations	Customs Union	Single Market	EU membership
Labour to Reform UK	218	174	100	104	68
Labour to Con	22	0	0	0	0
Labour to Lib Dems	1	0	0	0	0
Labour to Greens	18	1	0	0	0
Labour to SNP	32	28	7	9	5
Labour to Plaid Cymru	10	3	3	3	2
Labour to Others	6	0	0	0	0

The underlying dynamics which could lead Labour losing fewer seats to parties on both its flanks are well understood. As previous Best for Britain research has shown, for many years British voters have divided into a left-leaning pro-European bloc, and a right-leaning eurosceptic bloc⁶. Since the 2024 general election, Reform UK has been successful, in national opinion polls, in reanimating the right-leaning coalition of voters which swept Boris Johnson to power in 2019.

Meanwhile, Labour's 2024 vote has fragmented in multiple directions, to the Greens and Lib Dems in parts of England, to the SNP in Scotland, to Plaid Cymru in Wales. Many of Labour's 2024 voters say they are uncertain who they would back at the next election, or say they would not vote at all. Previous Best for Britain research has shown that Labour's policy

⁶ See Best for Britain, [The Brexit Report: Public attitudes towards Brexit ahead of the 2025 Budget](#), October 2025.

position on EU relations will be essential to rebuilding its 2024 electoral coalition⁷.




Figure 4: Number of Labour 2024 seats lost to other parties (GB), according to Labour EU policy position

The more ambitious Labour's policy position on EU relations, the fewer seats it was estimated to lose to parties on both its left and right flanks across the whole of Great Britain.

⁷ Best for Britain, [How EU policy affects Labour's Electability](#), September 2026




Figure 5: Estimated impact of Labour pledging EU membership on Labour seats won at the 2024 General Election

Customs Union and Single Market

The Customs Union and Single Market MRPs indicated that going into the next election with a 'halfway house' commitment on UK-EU relations would improve Labour's performance considerably, compared to the June 2026 WVI scenario.

Under either scenario, Labour would be projected to hold onto more than 200 of its 2024 seats (216 for Customs Union, 215 for Single Market) by a margin of more than 5 percentage points. Under a Customs Union scenario, 72 further seats would be held marginally, with 65 seats held marginally if the party were to support Single Market membership.

Neither the Customs Union nor Single Market MRPs put Labour near the 326 mark needed for an overall majority. The best the party could realistically hope for in these scenarios was to try to form a coalition government.

To reach 326 seats, Labour was estimated to have to win all marginally-held seats and more than half the seats where it would be within touching distance.

The distinctly muted electoral success on offer from Labour supporting membership of either the Customs Union or Single Market reflected the findings of previous Best for Britain research⁸, which showed that joining the Single Market, or a Customs Union were the least popular options for UK-EU relations in nine of the 11 regions and nations of the UK.

This finding supported previous Best for Britain research which showed that beyond the UK Government negotiation red lines on UK-EU relations, only a policy of EU membership delivered a political dividend⁹. Previous Best for Britain focus groups have further underscored how Single Market and Customs Union membership remain vulnerable to criticism on grounds of sovereignty.

⁸ Best for Britain, [Beyond the red lines](#), September 2026

⁹ Best for Britain, [Is it time to talk about EU membership?](#), April 2026.




Figure 6: Estimated impact of Labour pledging joining the Customs Union on Labour seats won at the 2024 General Election




Figure 7: Estimated impact of Labour pledging joining the Single Market on Labour seats won at the 2024 General Election

Closer relations without joining the EU, Single Market or Customs Union

Labour's 2024 general election manifesto stated there would be "no return to the single market, the customs union, or freedom of movement"¹⁰. The data presented in this report clearly showed that going into the next election with the same 'red lines' was unlikely to be a sustainable political strategy.

Maintaining Labour's red lines was estimated to result in Labour failing to hold on to enough seats to form a coalition government.

¹⁰ Labour Party, [Change Labour Party Manifesto 2024](#), June 2024.




Figure 8: Estimated impact of Labour pledging a closer relationship with the EU, within its existing negotiation red lines, on Labour seats won at the 2024 General Election

WVI MRP

Based on the June 2026 data, Labour was estimated to be on track to win fewer than 100 seats, likely resulting in a Reform-led Government.

In this scenario, Labour was estimated to become an overwhelmingly London-centric party, with 45% of its MPs representing constituencies in the capital. The MRP also estimated that Labour would lose every seat in Wales. By contrast, it would win a majority of London seats.




Figure 9: June 2026 Westminster voting intention MRP impact on Labour seats won at the 2024 General Election

5.2. Scotland

A shift to a policy position of EU membership was found to benefit Labour in Scotland more than any other GB nation or region. In June 2026, Labour was on track to win just three MPs in Scotland. This would have represented a significant drop from the 37 MPs the party won in 2024.

A policy pitch of closer UK-EU relations, but without moving beyond the 2024 manifesto red lines on Europe, did not improve Labour's performance in Scotland. In this scenario, the party was estimated to lose 28 seats to the SNP, two seats to Reform UK, and to return just six MPs to Westminster.




Figure 10: Number of seats won by Labour in 2024 lost to other parties in Scotland, for each Labour EU policy position tested

Labour moving to a policy position of supporting EU membership was estimated to result in Labour winning 32 seats in Scotland, retaining 86% of the seats it won in 2024.

Labour's Scottish seat haul was projected to reach 28 in scenarios where the party offered a policy of joining the Customs Union, or where it supported Single Market membership. However, both these policy pitches would be vulnerable to a more ambitious EU policy offer by the SNP, which would likely reduce the appeal of both the Customs Union and Single Market policy offers.




Figure 11: Number of Labour 2024 seats held in Scotland, for each Labour EU policy position tested

Seat spotlight: Midlothian

Results in Figure 12 showed that without changing Labour's position on EU relations, Labour would likely lose the Midlothian constituency. On June 2026 voting intention, or with a policy of closer relations with the EU but still bound by Labour's 2024 manifesto red lines, the MRPs estimated that Midlothian would be won by the SNP.




Figure 12: Estimated vote shares of each Westminster party in the Midlothian constituency, for each Labour EU policy position tested

Results in Figure 12 showed that greater ambition on UK-EU relations would see larger estimated vote shares for Labour in Midlothian, and corresponding reductions in estimated vote shares of the SNP, Liberal Democrats and Green Party.

The estimated vote shares for Reform UK and the Conservatives were unaffected by Labour's policy position on EU relations. The MRP scenario in which Labour supported joining the Customs Union estimated that Labour would hold Midlothian by a small margin. The MRPs estimated that Labour would hold Midlothian with more comfortable Labour majorities where the party backed Single Market membership or EU membership.

5.3. Wales

Labour's policy position on EU relations could be existential for the party in Wales.

According to the June 2026 voting intention data, Welsh Labour would have been reduced to zero MPs due to a significant drop in Labour's vote share in Wales compared to its 2024 general election performance.




Figure 13: Number of seats won by Labour in 2024 lost to other parties in Wales, for each Labour EU policy position tested

Results in Figure 13 showed that in Wales, the greater Labour's ambition on UK-EU relations, the more seats Labour was estimated to win. A Labour policy position of EU membership was most effective at reducing seat losses to both Reform UK and Plaid Cymru.

According to the June 2026 data, Labour pursuing a policy of closer relations with the EU without amending its 2024 manifesto red lines, would not have significantly improved the party's result in Wales. In this MRP analysis, Labour was estimated to win just six Welsh constituencies: the four Cardiff seats, Gower, and Monmouthshire (the latter

two being close Labour-Reform contests). Meanwhile, Reform UK would have become the dominant across the country, winning 19 constituencies, including 18 from Labour.




Figure 14: Number of Labour 2024 seats held in Wales, for each Labour EU policy position tested

Labour was estimated to hold 15 of its 2024 Welsh seats in a scenario where the party supported a position of membership of the Customs Union, rising to 18 in a Single Market scenario. These 'gains' compared to the status quo projection would all come at the expense of Reform UK, whose projected seat haul plummeted as Labour's EU policy became more ambitious. In both the Customs Union and Single Market scenarios, Labour was estimated to be second-placed, but within five percentage points from the first-placed party, in a further five seats.

Going further, to a position of EU membership, would transform Labour's electoral prospects in Wales. Under this scenario, Labour would be projected to win 24 of the 32 constituencies, retaining a dominant position in Wales, and preventing Reform UK from

winning any seats (save for perhaps Mid and South Pembrokeshire, which is projected to be a Labour-Reform tie).

Seat spotlight: Aberfan Maesteg




Figure 15: Estimated vote shares of each Westminster party in the Aberfan Maesteg constituency, for each Labour EU policy position tested

Results in Figure 15 showed that greater ambition on UK-EU relations would see larger estimated vote shares for Labour in Aberfan Maesteg, and reductions in estimated vote shares for Plaid Cymru, the Liberal Democrats and the Green Party. The estimated vote shares for Reform UK and the Conservatives were unaffected by Labour's policy position on EU relations.

Results in Figure 15 showed that Labour would only hold Aberfan Maesteg in a scenario where it backed EU membership. In scenarios where Labour backed joining the Customs Union or the Single Market, the seat was estimated to be tied between Labour and Reform UK. Where Labour continued to support closer relations with the EU within its red lines, Reform UK was expected to win the seat.

5.4. The North West




Figure 16: Number of seats won by Labour in 2024 lost to other parties in the North West, for each Labour EU policy position tested

Results suggested that Labour by adopting a more ambitious policy position on UK-EU relations, Labour could expect to reap significant electoral rewards in the North West. In common with other British regions and nations, the more ambitious EU policy Labour adopted, the more seats it was estimated to win in the North West.




Figure 17: Number of Labour 2024 seats held in the North West, for each Labour EU policy position tested

In June 2026, Labour was on track to win 16 MPs in the North West at the next general election, down from the 65 the party won in 2024. In terms of seat haul, this projected drop of 49 MPs was greater than for any other UK nation or region.

Labour adopting a policy position of EU membership was estimated to deliver the best result for the party.

In this scenario Labour was estimated to hold onto 57 of the 65 seats it won in the North West in 2024, winning 44 of them by a margin of at least five percentage points.

A shift to closer EU relations, while retaining Labour's 2024 manifesto red lines, was estimated to see the party hold onto 32 of the North West seats it won at the last election. However, 10 of these constituencies were estimated to be Labour-Reform UK marginals.

Labour was estimated to retain 54 North West seats in the North West in an MRP scenario where the party supported Customs Union membership, or 49 in a Single Market scenario. Either scenario would see Reform UK make much weaker gains across the region compared to the status quo scenario.

Seat spotlight: Stalybridge and Hyde




Figure 18: Estimated vote shares of each Westminster party in the Stalybridge and Hyde constituency, for each Labour EU policy position tested

The MRP results showed that, the more ambitious Labour's policy position on EU relations, the more likely it was to win the constituency of Stalybridge and Hyde.

Once again, results showed that Labour's policy position on EU relations did not significantly change the estimated vote shares of the Conservatives or Reform UK.

5.5. East Midlands

According to the June 2026 voting intention data, Labour was on track to lose 25 of the 29 East Midlands constituencies it won in 2024 to Reform UK. Of the three seats it was estimated to hold, two - High Peak and Rushcliffe - had Labour ahead by less than five percentage points, leaving Nottingham East as the party's only remaining safe seat in the region.




Figure 19: Number of seats won by Labour in 2024 lost to other parties in the East Midlands, for each Labour EU policy position tested

Results suggested that, the more ambitious Labour's policy position on EU relations, the more seats won at the 2024 election it was estimated to hold in the East Midlands.




Figure 20: Number of Labour 2024 seats held in the East Midlands, for each Labour EU policy position tested

Labour's electoral prospects in the East Midlands improved as its policy position on UK-EU relations became more ambitious. In the scenario where Labour recommitted to its manifesto red lines on UK-EU relations, Labour was estimated to win nine seats. Five of these seats were marginal, with Labour estimated to be ahead of the second-placed party by less than five percentage points of vote share in the seats.

Labour's electoral prospects were estimated to improve significantly if it became party policy to join either the Customs Union, or Single Market. Under both these MRP scenarios, Labour was projected to win 17 seats in the East Midlands. In both scenarios, Labour was estimated to win ten seats by a margin of more than five percentage points of vote share, and a further seven seats by less than five percentage points.

In the scenario where Labour committed to EU membership, the party was estimated to win 20 seats in the East Midlands, retaining three more seats that it won in 2024 compared to the Single Market scenario, with one seat projected to be a tie.

Seat spotlight: Lincoln




Figure 21: Estimated vote shares of each Westminster party in the constituency of Lincoln, for each Labour EU policy position tested

The MRP results showed that the more ambitious Labour's policy position on EU relations, the more likely it was to win in the Lincoln constituency.

According to the June 2026 voting intention data, Reform UK was projected to take Lincoln with 31% of the vote, ahead of Labour on 22%. Reform UK was also estimated to take the seat, albeit with a much narrower margin of just two percentage points, in a scenario where Labour continued to pursue closer relations with the EU, but without changing its 2024 manifesto red lines.

Going beyond the red lines, however, was estimated to put Labour on track to win Lincoln. In the scenarios where Labour committed to join either the Customs Union, or the Single Market, Labour was estimated to hold the seat by less than five percentage points ahead of Reform UK.

Once again, Labour's policy position on EU relations was not found to significantly affect the vote share of either Reform UK, or the Conservative Party in the Lincoln constituency.

Labour was most likely to win the Lincoln seat in the scenario where the party adopted the most ambitious policy position: EU membership. Here, Labour's vote share was estimated to be 37%, with the combined Green and Lib Dem vote reduced to just 15%.

5.6. The South West

At the 2024 General Election, Labour won 24 of the region's 58 constituencies. However, according to the June 2026 voting intention data, Labour was on track to lose 15 of its South West seats to Reform UK, one to the Conservatives, and a further three seats to the Green Party.




Figure 22: Number of seats won by Labour in 2024 lost to other parties in the South West, for each Labour EU policy position tested

The results showed that in the South West, the more ambitious Labour's position on EU relations, the more of its 2024 seats it was likely to hold. In the scenario where Labour supported EU membership, the party was estimated to retain 21 of the 24 seats won in 2024, with one seat a tie and just two expected losses to Reform UK.




Figure 23: Number of Labour 2024 seats held in the South West, for each Labour EU policy position tested

The results suggested that Labour's performance would improve if it moved to a position of supporting closer UK-EU relations while retaining Labour's 2024 manifesto red lines. In this MRP scenario, Labour was estimated to hold on to 13 seats - six of them by less than 5 percentage points - avoiding losses to the Greens and Conservatives, although it was still estimated to lose 11 seats to Reform UK. **Moving beyond the 2024 manifesto red lines would deliver a significant boost to Labour's performance in the South West.** The party was projected to return 16 of the MPs it elected in 2024 under scenarios of membership of the Customs Union, or membership of the Single Market.

Seat spotlight: Weston-super-Mare

In 2024 Labour won Weston-super-Mare for the first time since the constituency was created in 1918. Labour won with 39% of the vote, more than 4,000 votes ahead of the

Conservatives. Labour's 10.4% majority placed the seat 15th of the 24 seats the party won in the South West¹¹.




Figure 24: Estimated vote shares of each Westminster party in the Weston-super-Mare constituency, for each Labour EU policy position tested

The MRP results showed that the more ambitious Labour's policy position on EU relations, the more likely it was to win in the Weston-super-Mare constituency. The only scenario where Labour was estimated to win the seat, was the scenario where Labour supported membership of the EU.

In the scenario where Labour committed to EU membership, the party was estimated to gain 36% of the vote share in the seat, narrowly ahead Reform UK on 32%. Under both the Customs Union and Single Market scenarios, the seat was estimated to be a statistical tie between Labour and Reform UK. Where Labour committed to closer relations with the EU but kept in place its 2024 manifesto red lines, the MRP estimated Labour to win just 27% of the vote share in the seat, behind Reform UK on 31%.

¹¹ UK Parliament, [Results for the UK general election on 4 July 2024 South West, England - by majority](#).

5.7. Yorkshire and the Humber

At the 2024 General Election, Labour won 43 of the region's 54 constituencies. In 20 of the Labour-won constituencies, Labour returned majorities of more than 20%, while a further 19 had majorities above 10%.




Figure 25: Number of seats won by Labour in 2024 lost to other parties in Yorkshire and the Humber, for each Labour EU policy position tested




Figure 26: Number of Labour 2024 seats held in Yorkshire and the Humber, for each Labour EU policy position tested

The MRP results in Figure 25 and 26 showed that moving beyond the 2024 manifesto red lines on EU relations significantly improved Labour's electoral prospects in Yorkshire and the Humber.

According to June 2026 voting intention data, Labour was estimated to retain just **seven Yorkshire and Humberside constituencies**. Five of these were estimated to be marginal seats, with just two - Leeds North East and Leeds North West - estimated to be won by Labour with more than a five percentage point margin from the second-placed party.

In the scenario where Labour maintained its policy position of seeking closer EU relations while retaining its 2024 manifesto red lines suggested Labour would retain only 17 constituencies it won in 2024.

The MRP data suggested that Labour would be able to make further advances if it abandoned its 2024 manifesto red lines to support membership of either the Customs

Union, or Single Market. In these MRP scenarios, Labour was projected to retain 26 and 25 of the Yorkshire and Humberside seats it won in 2024, respectively.

In Yorkshire and the Humber, Labour was estimated to perform best in the scenario where the party adopted a policy of EU membership. Under this MRP scenario, the party was expected to retain 27 of the constituencies it won in the region in 2024.

Seat spotlight: Ossett and Denby Dale




Figure 27: Estimated vote shares of each Westminster party in the Ossett and Denby Dale constituency, for each Labour EU policy position tested

In 2024 Labour won the newly-created constituency of Ossett and Denby Dale, in West Yorkshire. Here Labour took 39% of the vote, 4,500 votes clear of the Conservatives in second, and securing a majority of 10.4%. These margins mean the Ossett and Denby Dale ranked 39th of the 43 seats Labour won across the region¹².

¹² UK Parliament, [Results for the UK general election on 4 July 2024 - Yorkshire and The Humber, England - by majority](#).

The only MRP in which Labour was estimated to retain the constituency of Ossett and Denby Dale was the scenario where Labour committed to EU membership.

Here, Labour was projected to reach 36% of the vote (only marginally down on its winning 2024 vote share), ahead of Reform UK on 32%.

Both the MRPs for the scenarios where Labour committed to joining the Customs Union and Single Market scenarios estimated Labour to win the seat, but only by very narrow vote share margins.

Once more, Labour's policy position on EU relations was not found to impact Reform UK's estimated vote share. It did however reduce the estimated vote shares of the Liberal Democrats and the Green Party in the seat.

Labour was estimated to lose the seat in the MRP scenario where it committed to closer UK-EU relations but within its 2024 manifesto red lines, with Reform UK estimated to win 31% of the vote compared to Labour's 27%.

6. Seats where Labour could advance

The MRP data also reveals a number of seats where Labour could advance on its 2024 position, through a combination of its pro-EU position drawing support from other parties, and the rise of Reform UK splitting the vote of the right bloc.

The seats listed in this section were identified by:

- Analysing all GB seats that Labour did not win at the last election
- Across all EU policy MRPs, identifying seats where Labour was estimated to hold a minimum of a 10 percentage point lead of the second party

Table 8 below showed the constituencies identified as possible winnable seats for Labour. These were only present in the EU Membership MRP.

Table 8: Estimated party vote shares in seats where Labour could advance, where it adopts a policy of EU membership

Constituency name	Member	Con	Lab	LD	RUK	Green	PC
Bromley and Biggin Hill	Peter Fortune (Con)	23	37	6	25	7	-
Chester South and Eddisbury	Aphra Brandreth (Con)	25	37	6	23	6	-
Croydon South	Chris Philp (Con)	27	39	6	19	7	-
East Grinstead and Uckfield	Mims Davies (Con)	24	35	10	20	8	-
Exmouth and Exeter East	David Reed (Con)	19	37	9	25	7	-
Harborough, Oadby and Wigston	Neil O'Brien (Con)	23	37	5	25	8	-
Keighley and Ilkley	Robbie Moore (Con)	25	35	4	24	8	-
Kenilworth and Southam	Jeremy Wright (Con)	24	35	9	24	6	-
North West Essex	Kemi Badenoch (Con)	24	35	6	25	7	-
Reigate	Rebecca Paul (Con)	24	36	8	23	7	-
Salisbury	John Glen (Con)	22	37	10	23	5	-
South West Hertfordshire	Gagan Mohindra (Con)	23	33	12	23	6	-
Sutton Coldfield	Andrew Mitchell (Con)	26	36	4	25	6	-
Tatton	Esther McVey (Con)	25	40	5	21	6	-
Wetherby and Easingwold	Alec Shelbrooke (Con)	25	36	4	24	7	-
Windsor	Jack Rankin (Con)	24	35	10	21	7	-
Ynys Môn	Llinos Medi (Plaid Cymru)	16	35	2	25	5	12

In the EU Membership MRP, there were 17 seats where Labour was estimated to win the seat by a margin of 10 percentage points or more. These included high-profile seats such as the Leader of the Opposition's seat of North West Essex, and the Shadow Home Secretary's seat of Croydon South.

Of these 17 seats, the 16 seats in England showed that both Reform UK and the Conservative were competitive, splitting the right-of-centre vote, allowing Labour to 'come through the middle'.

The results of the 2024 General Election in these seats showed that many were won by thin margins by the Conservatives, except East Grinstead (where Reform UK did not stand), Kenilworth, and Windsor.

Table 9: 2024 General Election vote share results in listed seats

Constituency name	Member	Margin	Con	Lab	LD	RUK	Green	PC
Bromley and Biggin Hill	Peter Fortune (Con)	0.6	34.0	33.4	9.3	17.5	5.5	-
Chester South and Eddisbury	Aphra Brandreth (Con)	5.8	37.9	32.1	10.3	12.2	4.3	-
Croydon South	Chris Philp (Con)	4.7	40.0	35.3	8.9	8.4	5.8	-
East Grinstead and Uckfield	Mims Davies (Con)	16.8	38.3	20.7	21.5	0.0	10.5	-
Exmouth and Exeter East	David Reed (Con)	0.2	28.7	28.5	22.2	13.8	4.5	-
Harborough, Oadby & Wigston	Neil O'Brien (Con)	4.7	36.9	32.2	9.4	12.6	8.5	-
Keighley and Ilkley	Robbie Moore (Con)	3.5	40.2	36.7	2.1	10.4	5.3	-
Kenilworth and Southam	Jeremy Wright (Con)	12.3	36.4	24.0	19.6	13.0	5.9	-
North West Essex	Kemi Badenoch (Con)	4.8	35.6	30.8	11.1	14.1	5.2	-
Reigate	Rebecca Paul (Con)	6.0	35.4	29.4	12.7	13.6	8.8	-
Salisbury	John Glen (Con)	7.6	34.1	26.5	23.6	10.4	4.2	-
South West Hertfordshire	Gagan Mohindra (Con)	9.2	34.1	20.0	24.9	14.1	5.2	-
Sutton Coldfield	Andrew Mitchell (Con)	5.3	38.3	33.0	5.4	17.0	5.0	-
Tatton	Esther McVey (Con)	2.2	38.4	36.3	8.9	11.5	5.0	-
Wetherby and Easingwold	Alec Shelbrooke (Con)	9.3	39.4	30.1	6.4	13.9	8.7	-
Windsor	Jack Rankin (Con)	14.3	36.4	22.2	21.1	10.3	5.1	-
Ynys Môn	Llinos Medi (PC)	2.0	30.5	23.4	1.3	9.9	1.9	32.5

7. Liberal Democrat Seats

YouGov MRP polling modelled changes in the Labour Party’s position on EU policy. All other party positions were held constant.

Nevertheless, both the modelling of a general election under current circumstances (current Westminster Voting Intention) and the Labour EU policy MRPs offer insights into the current state of Liberal Democrat support and what this means for the Liberal Democrats’ own EU policy.

7.1. June 2026 Westminster Voting intention

If an election had been held in June 2026, YouGov modelling suggested the Liberal Democrats would have held on to 69 of the 72 seats they won at the 2024 General Election. They would have won a further eight seats, bringing their total estimated seat haul, on June 2026 voting intention data, to 77 seats. The June 2026 voting intention MRP further estimated Exmouth and Exeter East to be a statistical tie between the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats.

The three seats that the Liberal Democrats were projected to lose were listed in Table 10 below.

Table 10: Seats where the Liberal Democrats were estimated to lose the seat, based on June 2026 voting intention. Seat winners highlighted in green.

Constituency name	Member	Con	Lab	LD	RUK	Green	SNP	PC	Others
Newton Abbot	Martin Wrigley	19	8	28	32	10	-	-	3
Inverness, Skye and West Ross-shire	Angus MacDonald	5	4	25	17	9	38	-	3
Brecon, Radnor and Cwm Tawe	David Chadwick	14	5	16	23	6	-	33	4

Newton Abbot was estimated to be won by Reform UK, by only four percentage points. The Liberal Democrats won the seat of Newton Abbot from the Conservatives by a narrow margin at the 2024 election. The projected result therefore likely reflected Reform UK consolidating the Conservative vote behind them. The Green Party was also estimated to perform better than in 2024, doubling its vote share in the seat from 4.3% to 10%.

Based on the June 2026 voting intention data, the constituency of Inverness, Skye and West Ross-shire was on track to be won by the SNP. Again, the Liberal Democrats won the seat by a small margin in 2024.

A similar pattern held in Brecon, Radnor and Cwm Tawe: Plaid Cymru were projected to take the seat, possibly by consolidating Labour and Liberal Democrat defectors behind them.

The nine seats where the Liberal Democrats were projected to advance are listed in Table 11.

Table 11: New seats that Liberal Democrats were estimated to win (compared to 2024 General Election), and their one estimated tie. Second-place parties highlighted in yellow.

Constituency name	Member	Con	Lab	LD	RUK	Green	Others
East Hampshire	Damien Hinds (Con)	31	5	32	21	10	2
Farnham and Bordon	Gregg Stafford (Con)	32	6	33	17	11	2
Godalming and Ash	Jeremy Hunt (Con)	35	3	38	16	7	1
North Cotswolds	Geoffrey Clifton-Brown (Con)	29	7	30	20	12	2
North Dorset	Simon Hoare (Con)	28	4	31	26	9	2
Romsey and Southampton North	Caroline Nokes (Con)	33	4	34	19	9	2
Sheffield Hallam	Olivia Blake (Lab)	10	26	31	13	18	1
South Shropshire	Stuart Anderson (Con)	26	6	30	26	9	3
Exmouth and Exeter East (Tied)	David Reed (Con)	24	13	24	23	13	2

In eight of the seats, the Conservatives were the second-largest party, with only Sheffield Hallam being a Labour-facing seat. If the Liberal Democrats won these seats *plus* the three seats they were projected to lose in the June 2026 voting intention MRP, they could gain as many as 81 seats.

There were a further four seats where the June 2026 MRP estimated the Liberal Democrats to be marginally behind the Conservatives, as given in Table 12 below.

Table 12: Seats where the Liberal Democrats were estimated to be less than five percentage points behind the first placed party in June 2026

Constituency name	Member	Con	Lab	LD	RUK	Green	Others
Beaconsfield	Joy Morrissey (Con)	33	6	29	20	10	2
Hamble Valley	Gregg Stafford (Con)	32	5	29	21	11	2
Salisbury	John Glen (Con)	29	12	25	21	11	2
South West Hertfordshire	Gagan Mohindra (Con)	30	7	27	21	13	2

Therefore, combined with the seats listed in Table 11 above, the MRPs suggest the Liberal Democrats were competitive in as many as 85 seats overall.

7.2. How Labour's EU policy changes affect Liberal Democrat seats

The YouGov MRPs which tested different Labour policy positions on EU relations significantly reduced the Liberal Democrats' estimated seat hauls, even on modest Labour EU policy positions (such as committing to a closer relationship with the EU, but keeping its red lines).

This was because the YouGov MRPs did not prompt the policy positions of any party other than Labour, and did not account for any changes in party policy that would likely occur as a consequence of Labour's policy on EU relations, as prompted. This meant that the MRPs which tested different Labour policy positions on EU relations were mainly suited to modelling outcomes in constituencies where Labour was the sole competitive left-of-centre party, in seats contested by the Conservatives and/or Reform UK.

The MRPs which tested different Labour policy positions on EU relations did not include consideration of tactical voting either, which is an important factor at every UK General Election, and in Liberal Democrat seats.

Consequently, for the Liberal Democrats, the results in MRPs which tested different Labour policy positions on EU relations produced seat totals which would ultimately be unlikely to be reflected at an actual election event.

8. Green Party Seats

As with the Liberal Democrats, the MRPs offered insights about the current state of Green support and implications for their EU policy.

8.1. June 2026 Westminster voting intention

The June 2026 Westminster voting intention MRP suggested that the Green Party would keep all four seats it won at the 2024 General Election and take an additional 18 seats, as listed in Table 13 below.

Table 13: Seats where the Green Party was estimated to win based on June 2026 Westminster voting intention data. Second-place parties highlighted in yellow.

Constituency name	Member	Con	Lab	LD	RUK	Green	Others
Bethnal Green and Stepney	Rushanara Ali	9	25	11	10	26	19
Birkenhead	Alison McGovern	7	26	8	26	30	3
Brighton Kemptown and Peacehaven	Chris Ward	16	22	11	19	31	2
Bristol East	Kerry McCarthy	11	21	7	15	44	2
Bristol North East	Damien Egan	12	24	8	24	29	2
Bristol South	Karin Smyth	10	21	8	23	35	2
Gorton and Denton	Andrew Gwynne*	9	27	7	27	28	3
Huddersfield	Harpreet Uppal	12	18	8	26	34	2
Leeds Central and Headingley	Alex Sobel	8	25	8	17	40	2
Leeds South	Hilary Benn	11	25	6	24	31	3
Lewisham North	Vicky Foxcroft	9	35	10	9	37	1
Liverpool Riverside	Kim Johnson	6	31	7	19	34	2
Manchester Rusholme	Afzal Khan	10	28	6	12	43	2
Manchester Withington	Jeff Smith	9	32	16	9	33	1
Norwich South	Clive Lewis	12	25	12	19	29	2
Sheffield Central	Abtisam Mohamed	9	25	9	9	47	1
Stratford and Bow	Uma Kumaran	9	24	6	12	31	17
Walthamstow	Stella Creasy	8	35	6	11	37	2

The results in the table above therefore suggested that the Green Party was on track to win up to 22 seats, based on June 2026 Westminster voting intention data (which put the Green party on 15% of the national vote share). The table above includes Gorton and Denton as it was won by Labour in 2024. The Green Party (Hannah Spencer) won the seat in the Gorton

and Denton by-election in February 2026.

The June 2026 Westminster voting intention MRP data identified a further 29 seats where the Green Party was less than five percentage points behind the seat winner. These seats were listed in Table 14 below. All were won in 2024 by Labour (except Leicester South, won by an independent candidate).

Table 14: Seats where the Green Party was estimated to be less than five percentage points behind the first placed party in June 2026 (contd. on next page)

Constituency name	Member	Con	Lab	LD	RUK	Green	SNP	PC	Others
Barking	Nesil Caliskan	11	24	6	28	27	0	0	4
Bermondsey and Old Southwark	Neil Coyle	10	28	21	12	26	0	0	1
Bristol North West	Darren Jones	13	30	11	16	28	0	0	2
Cambridge	Daniel Zeichner	13	29	20	9	28	0	0	1
Dulwich and West Norwood	Helen Hayes	11	36	10	10	33	0	0	1
Ealing Central and Acton	Rupa Huq	18	28	16	13	24	0	0	2
Ealing North	James Murray	18	27	10	21	22	0	0	3
Exeter	Steve Race	14	27	10	22	26	0	0	2
Hackney South and Shoreditch	Meg Hillier	8	40	7	8	36	0	0	1
Ilford South	Jas Athwal	15	24	7	15	20	0	0	19
Islington South and Finsbury	Emily Thornberry	11	35	10	12	31	0	0	1
Leicester South	Shockat Adam	14	15	8	15	23	0	0	25
Leicester West	Liz Kendall	17	22	8	26	24	0	0	2
Lewisham West and East Dulwich	Ellie Reeves	10	38	9	9	33	0	0	1
Leyton and Wanstead	Calvin Bailey	13	32	9	14	29	0	0	2
Newcastle upon Tyne North	Catherine McKinnell	13	28	14	19	24	0	0	2
Oxford East	Anneliese Dodds	13	28	11	11	27	0	0	11
Peckham	Miatta Fahnbulleh	8	37	10	11	33	0	0	1
Reading Central	Matt Rodda	19	28	11	15	25	0	0	2
Sheffield Heeley	Louise Haigh	10	27	10	25	26	0	0	2
Southampton Test	Satvir Kaur	16	21	10	26	25	0	0	2
Streatham and Croydon North	Steve Reed	12	32	13	13	28	0	0	1
Tottenham	David Lammy	9	35	7	13	34	0	0	2
Vauxhall and Camberwell Green	Florence Eshalomi	10	33	13	11	31	0	0	1

Constituency name	Member	Con	Lab	LD	RUK	Green	SNP	PC	Others
West Ham and Beckton	James Asser	11	24	6	17	23	0	0	19
York Central	Rachael Maskell	13	31	9	19	26	0	0	2
Edinburgh North and Leith	Tracy Gilbert	11	20	10	9	22	26	0	2
Edinburgh South West	Scott Arthur	14	18	11	13	19	23	0	3
Cardiff South and Penarth	Stephen Doughty	12	17	7	16	22	0	23	3

Combining the four seats the Green Party won at the 2024 General Election, the 18 seats where the party was estimated to win based on June 2026 Westminster voting intention data and the 29 seats in Table 14 above suggested the Green Party could be competitive in up to 51 seats. Since Andy Burnham became Prime Minister in June, the Green Party's vote share has reduced significantly, however. The EU policy MRPs demonstrate this, with large changes in vote share in seats where the Greens are competitive, when Labour switches to more ambitious policy positions.

8.2. How Labour's EU policy changes affected Green seats

As with the Liberal Democrat seats, the YouGov MRPs which tested different Labour policy positions on EU relations significantly reduced the Green Party's estimated seat hauls, even on modest Labour EU policy positions (such as committing to a closer relationship with the EU, but keeping its red lines).

As with the Liberal Democrat's seats, this was likely because the YouGov MRPs did not prompt the policy positions of any party other than Labour, and did not account for any changes in party policy that would likely occur as a consequence of Labour's policy on EU relations, as prompted. This meant that the MRPs which tested different Labour policy positions on EU relations were mainly suited to modelling outcomes in constituencies where Labour was the sole competitive left-of-centre party, in seats contested by the Conservatives and/or Reform UK.

The MRPs which tested different Labour policy positions on EU relations did not include consideration of tactical voting either, which is an important factor at every UK General Election, and in Liberal Democrat seats. Consequently, for the Green Party, the results in MRPs which tested different Labour policy positions on EU relations produced **seat totals** which would ultimately be unlikely to be reflected at an actual election event.

However, unlike Liberal Democrat held seats, all the seats where the Green Party was estimated to be competitive were held by Labour, and therefore it is likely that Labour would seek to defend them. This meant that the seats where the Green Party was estimated to be competitive were likely to be a contest, where EU policy of each party is likely to be a significant factor.

9. How Labour's EU policy would affect an Election

To estimate how Labour's policy position on EU relations could affect the outcome of a future election, we combined the results of the June 2026 Westminster voting intention MRP and the YG EU policy MRP vote share estimates to create a low, central and high scenario for seat haul for each political party.

None of the results presented in this section are predictions of the outcome of an election. Instead, the low, central and high estimates were produced to establish how Labour's policy position on EU relations would change the outcome of a General Election. To create the estimates, a number of decisions on seat-level outcomes were necessary.

Tied seats. For each MRP, results for each party included a number of constituencies where the modelled vote share result was a tie - where two or more parties achieved the exact same vote share. These seats were called tied seats.

Marginal seats. Across all MRPs, many seat results had the winning party's vote share within five percentage points of the second and/or third party. These seats were all classed as marginal.

Tactical voting and targeting. As discussed, the MRPs which tested different Labour policy positions on EU relations were effective at predicting the changes in vote share where Labour was the main left-of-centre party, in a seat mainly contested by Reform UK and/or the Conservatives. For this reason, the competitiveness of the Liberal Democrats and Green Party was considered based on the party's competitiveness in the June 2026 Westminster voting intention MRP, to provide a range of possible outcomes.

9.1. How 'Low' estimates are calculated

For each of the EU policy MRP seat level results, the 'Low' estimates were determined by skewing the seat level decisions of tied and marginal seats against Labour, simulating a 'bad day' for Labour.

Labour Seats. Labour was only awarded seats where the EU policy MRP estimated Labour to be more than five percentage points clear of the second-placed party. In seats where Labour was estimated to marginally win the seat (by less than five percentage points), these were awarded to the second-placed party.

All other seats. For seats estimated to be won by any party other than Labour, the seats were awarded to the party estimated to have the highest vote share in the seat according to the MRP.

Green seats. Given all seats where the Green Party could be competitive were Labour-held seats, the 'Low' estimates awarded all seats where the June 2026 MRP estimated the Green Party were competitive to the Green Party. This meant awarding all the seats won by the Green Party at the 2024 General Election, all seats in Table 13 (where WVI MRP estimated the Green party to win the seats on June 2026 voting intention data), and seats where Greens were estimated to be less than five percentage points behind Labour (in Table 14) to the Green Party. In total, this awarded 51 seats to the Green Party, and constituted an unrealistically high seat haul for the Green Party.

Liberal Democrat seats. As discussed in section (Liberal Democrat seats), the WVI MRP only predicted Sheffield Hallam to become a Labour-Liberal Democrat contest. All other Liberal Democrat seats were a contest between the Liberal Democrats and the Conservatives, or Reform UK. For this reason, in the 'Low' estimates, Liberal Democrat seats were simply awarded all 69 seats they were expected to keep according to the June 2026 Westminster voting intention MRP. This means they were not awarded the three seats they were expected to lose in the June 2026 Westminster voting intention MRP in Table 10.

Tied seats. For all seats where Labour was one of the tied parties, the seat was awarded to the other tied party, meaning none of Labour's tied seats were awarded to Labour.

Taken together, these estimates created an unrealistically pessimistic scenario for the Labour Party, an unrealistically optimistic scenario for the Green Party, and a plausible scenario for all other Westminster Parties.

9.2. How 'Central' estimates were calculated

Labour Seats. Labour was awarded all seats where the EU policy MRP estimated Labour to be more than five percentage points clear of the second placed party, as well as marginal seats where Labour was ahead by four or more percentage points. This meant that seats where Labour was estimated to be ahead by less than four percentage points were awarded to the second-placed party.

All other seats. For seats estimated to be won by any party other than Labour, the seats were awarded to the party estimated to have the highest vote share in the seat according to the MRP.

Green seats. The Green Party was awarded all seats it won at the 2024 General Election, all seats in Table 13 (where WVI MRP estimated the Green party to win the seats on June 2026 voting intention data), but none of the seats where Greens were less than five percentage

points behind Labour (in Table 14). In total, this awarded 22 seats to the Green Party, and constituted a realistic scenario for the Green Party, where its national vote share approximated 15%.

Liberal Democrat seats. In the Central estimates, the Liberal Democrats were awarded all seats won by the Liberal Democrats at the 2024 General Election.

Tied seats. For all seats where Labour was one of the tied parties, the seat was awarded to the other tied party, meaning none of Labour's tied seats were awarded to Labour.

Taken together, these estimates created an unrealistically optimistic scenario for the Green Party given its national vote share at the time of publication of the report, and a plausible scenario for all other Westminster Parties.

9.3. How 'High' estimates were calculated

Labour Seats. Labour was awarded all seats where the EU policy MRP estimated Labour to be more than five percentage points clear of the second placed party, as well as all marginal seats where Labour was ahead by less than five percentage points.

All other seats. For seats estimated to be won by any party other than Labour, the seats were awarded to the party estimated to have the highest vote share in the seat according to the MRP.

Green seats. The Green Party was awarded all seats it won at the 2024 GE, but none of the seats where Greens were either five percentage points ahead or behind Labour. In total, this awarded the Green Party the four seats it won at the 2024 General Election.

Liberal Democrat seats. In the 'High' estimates, the Liberal Democrats were awarded all 69 seats they won at the 2024 General Election, as well as the additional nine seats in Table 11 where the Liberal Democrats could advance in the June 2026 Westminster Voting intention MRP. This brought the total number of Liberal Democrats seats to 80.

Tied seats. For all seats where Labour was one of the tied parties, the seat was awarded to the Labour Party, meaning all of Labour's tied seats were awarded to Labour.

Taken together, these estimates created an unrealistically optimistic scenario for the Labour Party and the Liberal Democrats, and an unrealistically pessimistic scenario for the Conservatives and Reform UK. It created a plausible scenario for the Green Party.

9.4. Results in all scenarios

Results for the four scenarios, and for the three different estimate ranges, are detailed in full in the table below (Table 15).

Table 15: Estimated aggregate seat results for each MRP, for each Labour EU policy position tested

	Closer relationship			Customs Union			Single Market			EU Membership		
	Low	Central	High	Low	Central	High	Low	Central	High	Low	Central	High
Con	50	50	41	21	18	6	20	18	5	9	8	3
Lab	92	136	205	190	256	356	194	257	353	250	321	414
Ref	320	300	253	268	235	164	261	230	164	228	191	117
LD	69	72	81	69	72	81	69	72	81	69	72	81
Grn	51	22	4	51	22	4	51	22	4	51	22	4
SNP	39	40	37	22	19	11	26	22	16	17	12	6
PC	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	5	4	4	4
Other	5	6	5	5	4	4	5	5	4	4	2	3

9.5. 'Closer relationship' (current government position)




Figure 28: Number of parliamentary seats for each party in a scenario where Labour pledged to continue with the current government position

In a scenario where it continued with its current position, the Labour Party fell short of obtaining a majority of seats, by between 121 seats (in a high estimate) and 234 seats (low estimate).

In this scenario, it was unlikely Labour would secure enough seats to form a government, or lead a coalition government. By contrast, the estimated seat hauls of Reform UK and the Conservatives seats put them within range to form a coalition government on both Low and Central estimates.

9.6. Single Market and Customs Union

In a scenario where Labour pledged to join the Customs Union or Single Market, Labour's seat haul improved significantly. At 256 (CU) or 257 (SM) seats, Labour almost doubled its seats compared to a scenario where it kept the current government position.




Figure 29: Number of parliamentary seats for each party in a scenario where Labour pledged to join the EU Customs Union




Figure 30: Number of parliamentary seats for each party in a scenario where Labour pledged to join the EU Single Market

However, taking the central estimate, Labour still fell 70 seats short of an absolute majority. Combining their seat total with the Liberal Democrats (72) puts them two seats above the number to form a coalition. This suggests that any Customs Union or Single Market policy would result in a two- or even three-party left-of-centre coalition.

Using the central estimates, Reform UK (236) and the Conservatives (18) won around 40% of the seats altogether, meaning they would struggle to form a coalition.

Although the high estimate does give Labour an absolute majority, it is a narrow one and - as mentioned in section 11.3 - this is an 'unrealistically optimistic scenario for Labour'.

Despite the differences in the policies, it was striking that Labour's seat haul in the Customs Union and Single Market scenarios was almost identical, suggesting there would be little

political benefit from pledging Single Market over Customs Union (despite the former leading to higher economic growth)¹³.

Labour moving to support either a Customs Union or Single Market policy would likely increase its seat haul, compared to if it maintained its red lines on EU relations.

However neither policy put Labour close to the seat haul necessary to form a majority government after the next General Election.

This meant the Customs Union and Single Market policy positions would likely result in a Labour-led coalition government.

However, with even central estimates of both Customs Union and Single Market MRPs putting the Labour and Liberal Democrat combined seat haul only narrowly clear of the 326 mark necessary for a parliamentary majority, the results suggested that a three-party, rather than a two-party coalition would be a possible outcome.

The Customs Union and Single Market MRP central estimates also suggested that Reform UK and Conservatives would be less likely to gain enough seats to be able to form a government, even in a coalition.

¹³ Frontier Economics and Best for Britain, [Modelling EU-UK Integration Scenarios](#), 21/06/2026

9.7. EU Membership




Figure 31: Number of parliamentary seats for each party in a scenario where Labour pledged to pursue full EU membership

The EU membership MRP was the only one that estimated Labour's seat haul to be within range of forming a majority government, with Central estimates showing Labour winning 321 seats - five short of a majority.

The EU membership scenario also resulted in the worst Central estimate for both Reform UK and the Conservatives of all scenarios tested.

Labour moving to a policy of EU membership damaged the Conservatives's estimated seat haul more than Reform UK's.

The results showed that the more ambitious Labour's policy on EU relations, the better Labour's estimated seat haul.

The results showed that Labour's policy on EU relations could be the difference between a Labour-led government, and a Reform-led one.

10. Conclusions

The results in this report showed that the more ambitious Labour's policy pitch on EU relations, the better the party's electoral performance at the next General Election is likely to be.

All EU relationship options beyond the UK Government's current red lines were found to increase Labour's voting intention above Reform UK's, rising to 37% of national vote share where Labour supported membership of the EU. Crucially, Labour moving to a more ambitious policy position did not result in an increase in support for Reform UK, or the Conservative Party.

Best for Britain then used the YouGov projections and conducted further modelling and analysis. Our analysis of how Labour's policy pitch on EU relations would affect seats won by Labour at the 2024 General Election showed that the more ambitious Labour was, the more constituencies it was likely to hold on to. EU membership was the only EU policy position which put Labour close to keeping a parliamentary majority, with the party estimated to hold on to 323 seats it won at the last election in this scenario - just three short of a majority.

The more ambitious Labour's policy position on EU relations, the fewer seats it was estimated to lose to parties on both its left and right flanks across the whole of Great Britain. In seats where Labour is facing Reform UK, by appealing to left-of-centre voters, an ambitious EU policy allowed Labour to outpace Reform UK, winning more contests. In seats where Labour is facing parties on its left flank, again by appealing to left-of-centre voters, it was able to push challengers into second place. The effect was observed in all regions of England, but was most noticeable in Scotland and Wales, where Labour is facing a real possibility of being squeezed out of Westminster politics altogether.

In Scotland, moving to a policy position of EU membership resulted in Labour retaining 32 seats, or 86% of the constituencies it won in 2024. In Wales, an election pledge to EU membership resulted in Labour retaining up to 24 of the 27 constituencies won at the last election.

Labour moving to support a policy of either joining a Customs Union or the EU Single Market was found to substantially increase the party's national vote share too, to 34% and 33% respectively. However, previous Best for Britain research found the Customs Union and Single Market policy proposals to be the least popular of any option for closer relations with the EU, even behind the UK Government's current approach to EU relations within its

2024 manifesto red lines. As such, it was most likely that the positive performance of the policies was due to respondents being 'squeezed'. That is to say that the draw of even these more modest Labour policy pitches on EU relations were enough to significantly shift voting patterns in Labour's favour, despite people preferring EU membership.

However, neither a policy pledge to joining the Customs Union, or the EU Single Market, put Labour close to the seat haul necessary to form a majority government after the next General Election. Indeed, the results showed that a Labour-led coalition government would be the only likely electoral outcome of Labour pledging to join the Customs Union or Single Market. Furthermore, this was before consideration of how all other parties might react to Labour backing a Customs Union or the EU Single Market at an election, which was not captured by the data presented in this report. This would likely be a significant factor in Scotland and Wales, where the SNP and Plaid Cymru could simply outflank Labour by pitching a policy of full EU membership.

The impossibility of modelling how all other parties would react to Labour offering different policies on EU relations at the next election, the various combinations of reaction possible, and the practicalities of General Elections such as tactical voting, meant that the seat totals for the Liberal Democrats and the Green Party were ultimately unlikely to be reflected at an actual election event. Consequently, Best for Britain used the YouGov projections and conducted further modelling and analysis to develop a scenario-based approach to estimate overall seat hauls for each of the scenarios modelled. The results, however, were the same. Labour maintaining its red lines on EU relations was estimated to result in Labour failing to hold on to enough seats to form a government - whether alone, or in coalition. Both the scenarios where Labour pledged to join a Customs Union or the EU Single Market were most likely to result in a Labour-led coalition government. The only scenario to place Labour close to obtaining a majority, was where it pledged to take the UK into the EU. In this scenario, Labour was estimated to win 321 seats - five short of a majority.

Whichever way the data was analysed, more ambitious policy pitches by Labour worsened the electoral prospects of both the Conservative Party, and Reform UK. The more ambitious Labour's pitch on EU relations, the more the Conservative Party was likely to be squeezed out of seat contests by both Reform UK on its right flank, and by the parties on its left flank. The more ambitious Labour's policy position on EU relations, the fewer seats Reform UK was likely to win - because Labour successfully appealed to more left-of-centre voters in more constituencies, winning more contests against Reform UK in seats across Great Britain.

As political parties start to shift their focus to the next UK General Election, the data in this report suggests that a commitment to EU membership in Labour's next manifesto will be key to returning a Labour-led government, rather than a Reform UK-led one.

With thanks to:

Joshua Edwicker and Cary Mitchell

Published by:

Best for Britain Limited, September 2026

36-38 Cornhill, London, EC3V 3NG

Copyright © Best for Britain, 2026

ISBN 978-1-0654205-0-7

The moral right of the authors has been asserted. All rights reserved. Without limiting the rights under copyright reserved above, no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored or introduced into a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means (electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise), without the prior written permission of both the copyright owner and the publisher of this book.

Published and promoted by Cary Mitchell on behalf of Best for Britain Limited at International House, 36-38 Cornhill, London EC3V 3NG

bestforbritain.org

**Evidence.
Action.
Hope.**